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NOTES
The Evolution of the Escape Clause: The United
States' Quest for Effective Relief from Fairly
Traded Imports
The escape clause in U.S. international trade law is once more
under congressional scrutiny, this time within the Omnibus Trade
and Competitiveness Legislation of 1987.' The escape clause 2 pro-
vides the legal framework for relief in the form of quotas or other
trade restrictions for a domestic industry injured by fairly traded im-
ports.3 The clause is currently undergoing its third major revision
since its appearance in U.S. statutory law in 1951, 4 and is most con-
troversial this time because of the nation's immense $159.2 billion
1987 trade deficit.5
This note describes the evolution of the U.S. escape clause and
discusses its roots in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), the various revisions it has experienced up to its present
status, and the possible changes it will undergo by means of the
pending trade legislation.
Article XIX of the GATT6 is the international basis for the U.S.
I H.R. 3, OMNIBUS TRADE AND COMPETITIVENESS LEGISLATION, 100th CONG., 2d
SESS., COMPARISON OF HOUSE AND SENATE PROVISIONS 71 (Comm. Print 1987) [hereinafter
OMNIBUS TRADE LEGISLATION]. The Committee Print was made available to House and
Senate members working on the legislation as it goes through Conference in 1988, and
contains the provisions of S. 1420, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. §§ 201-204 (1987) [hereinafter
S. 1420], and H.R. 3, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 201-204 (1987) [hereinafter H.R. 3].
2 Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978-2076 (1975) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C. (1982)) [hereinafter Trade Act of 1974]. The
escape clause is currently found in the Trade Act of 1974, § 201, 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1982).
3 Fairly traded imports are those which enter the United States legally, without vio-
lating any domestic law or international agreement. Cf. Trade Act of 1974, § 301 (codified
as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (Supp. III 1985)), which provides the statutory mecha-
nism for relief from unfair imports.
4 Trade Agreement Extension Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-50, § 7, 65 Stat. 72, 74
(1951) [hereinafter Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951]. The escape clause under-
went its first major change in 1962 in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-
794, § 301, 76 Stat. 872, 884-85 (1962). The second major revision was in the Trade Act
of 1974, supra note 2.
5 COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., ECONOMIC INDICATORS:
FEBRUARY 1988 36 (1988).
6 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT]. See generally J. JACKSON,
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escape clause, currently embodied in section 201 of the Trade Act of
1974. 7 The GATT clause was the realization of U.S. desires8 for a
safeguard promise within the GATT which would allow states to
waive their commitments or infringe upon agreed rules of conduct in
the event of exceptional circumstances, such as the decline of ineffi-
cient domestic industries that fail to compete effectively with im-
ports.9 The escape clause provides a means by which governments
can literally "escape" GATT tariff concessions and thereby protect
their interests from imports that are likely to injure domestic indus-
tries.' 0 The particular purpose of the escape clause in the GATT
was to give more flexibility to the commitments undertaken, and to
insure countries would not find themselves in such a rigid position
that they could not resolve emergency trade situations." Article
XIX was therefore aimed at remedying a temporary situation.
Article XIX, 1 (a), entitled "Emergency Action of Imports of Par-
ticular Products," expressly provides for certain protective action
if, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the
obligations incurred by a contracting party under this agreement,
including tariff concessions, any product is being imported into the
territory of that contracting party in such increased quantities and
under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to do-
mestic producers in that territory of like or directly competitive
products.... 12
WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 553 (1969) [hereinafter WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW
OF GATT]. For an explanation of the application of the GATT and its origins, see Rogoff
& Gauditz, The Provisional Application of International Agreements, 39 ME. L. REV. 29, 64
(1987); Ehrenhaft, A U.S. View of the GATT, 14 INT'L Bus. LAw. 146 (1986).
The GATT assumes that international trade is beneficial to economic growth, that
self-interested policies inhibit trade, and that an international agreement is the best way to
accomplish trade goals. The GATIT's fundamental premise is that expanding international
trade is beneficial to both importing and exporting countries. Giesse & Lewin, The Mul-
tifiber Arrangement: "Temporary" Protection Run Amuck, 19 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 51 (1987).
7 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1982).
8 U.S. pressures produced the GATT escape clause. As Jackson explains, the clause
was a prerequisite for the U.S. signing the treaty:
U.S. participation in GATT was not a 'free-trade' move, but a 'free-trader'
move. Legislative history of the 1945 Congressional debate on the law that
authorized the United States to join GATT is replete with congressional
complaints of injury to domestic industry through concessions in trade trea-
ties. These complaints were answered by pointing to the U.S. practice of
including an 'escape clause' in each of its agreements.
WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT, supra note 6, at 553.
9 Lochmann, Japanese Voluntary Restraint on Automobile Exports: An Abandonment of the
Free Trade Principles of the GA TT and the Free Market Principles of the United States Antitrust Laws,
27 HARV. INT'L L.J. 99, 119 (1986) ("The shift towards industries with a comparative ad-
vantage is absolutely necessary to achieve the gains from international trade, but it is pain-
ful for declining industries and displaced workers."). Though such a shift cannot really be
considered exceptional, and can rather be expected, it is still considered an "unforeseen
development" under GATT, supra note 6, art. XIX: 1(a). See also infra note 14 and accom-
panying text.
10 See Merciai, Safeguard Measures in GATT, 15J. WORLD TRADE L. 41 (1981).
l WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT, supra note 6, at 554.
12 GAIT, supra note 6, art. XIX: l(a).
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The phrase "in such increased quantities" has been interpreted
as including an "increase relative to domestic production.' 3 There-
fore, imports could actually decrease in absolute terms but rise rela-
tive to domestic consumption of the goods. The requirement that
the imports be a result of "unforeseen developments" has become
so lenient that "one can almost conclude that an increase in imports
itself can be an unforeseen development."'14 In practice, this re-
quirement, along with the rule that the imports result from the effect
of obligations incurred under the GATT, have been of virtually no
significance. 15
The necessity of "serious injury" implies that the injury must be
more severe than that concerning dumping and subsidies. 16 In
1951, a GATT Working Party 17 in the Hatter's Fur case' 8 concluded
that the United States was entitled to the benefit of the doubt as to
whether its domestic industry had suffered injury. This holding
greatly expanded the interpretation of Article XIX, widening it per-
haps more than was originally intended by many of the contracting
parties.' 9
13 E. McGOVERN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION 291 (1986) (discussing Report of
Working Party on Modifications to the General Agreement, BISD 11/39 (1952), at 44)
[hereinafter INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION]. This analysis is embodied in U.S. statu-
tory law. See Trade Act of 1974, § 201(b)(2)(c), 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(2)(c) (1982). See also
Unwrought Copper, USITC Pub. 1549, Inv. No. TA-201-52 (1984) (majority of ITC commis-
sioners held that this test is met under section 201 if imports have increased in absolute
quantities or relative to domestic production). But see Wood Shakes and Shingles, USITC Pub.
1826, Inv. No. TA-201-56 (1986) (Chairman Liebeler takes the view that there must be an
increase in the absolute volume of imports under review).
14 WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT, supra note 6, at 561 (discussing Report on
the Withdrawal by the United States of a Tariff Concession Under Article XIX of the
GATT, Geneva, Nov. 1951 (Sales No. GATr/1951-53) [hereinafter Hatter's Fur case]).
See also Lowenfeld, Fair or Unfair Trade: Does It Matter?, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 205, 218
(1980). If such an increase in imports itself can be an unforeseen development, "there
really is no requirement of concession at all other than the fact of an increase in imports;
the only real condition for invoking Article XIX is the existence of injury." Id. at 218.
15 INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION, supra note 13, at 291. It is worth noting that
the unforeseen development requirement has never been given force in U.S. legislation, and
the effect of obligations link was removed in the Trade Act of 1974. See text accompanying
infra note 71.
16 INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION, supra note 13, at 291. Article VI requires "ma-
terial injury." See WORLD TRADE AND THE LAw OF GATT, supra note 6, at 407-38. It has,
nevertheless, been said that fair and unfair trade have actually similar criteria which look to
the importing and not the exporting country. Lowenfeld states, "I find it hard to believe
that the word 'serious' before injury in Art. XIX is powerfully different from the word
'material' before injury in Article VI." Lowenfeld, supra note 14, at 218.
17 Although no single, definite dispute settlement procedure exists in GATT, this
Working Party was once put together to deal with an Article XIX problem. WORLD TRADE
AND THE LAw OF GATT, supra note 6, at 201-48. See also, Comment, The GATT Dispute
Settlement Procedure in the 1980's: Where Do We Go From Here?, 5 DICK. J. INT'L L. 82 (1986).
18 In 1951, the U.S. Tariff Commission withdrew a concession (negotiated in 1951 in
Geneva) pursuant to a successful invocation of the United States escape clause by the Hat-
ter's Fur industry. The withdrawal was challenged by Czechoslovakia, and the GATT set
up a Working Party to review the matter. See Hatter's Fur case, supra note 14.
19 INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION, supra note 13, at 291.
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The phrase "domestic producers in that territory of like or di-
rectly competitive products" is intended to be broader than the term
"like products" alone. 20 The definition is such that if imports can be
said to truly cause injury, it seems "that in most cases that is evidence
that they are 'directly competitive.' t21
Upon fulfillment of the requirements outlined, the party invok-
ing Article XIX may withdraw or modify a trade concession or im-
pose a quantitative restriction on the product.22 In practice, the
latter has been imposed about twice as often as raising tariffs.23 It is
generally held that the invoking party's measures must not discrimi-
nate between exporting countries,2 4 in compliance with the most fa-
vored nation obligation found in Article I of the GATI'.25 When a
contracting party takes escape clause action, it must give written no-
tice to the other contracting parties, with an exception made for
"critical circumstances where delay would cause damage."2 6 The
contracting parties to the GATT have no adjudicatory role in invok-
ing the escape clause, although a Working Party was set up once with
respect to the Hatter's Fur case. 27
Furthermore, there is general agreement that safeguard meas-
ures are not meant to protect domestic producers for an unlimited
period of time. 28 Instead, they "are emergency measures which
should therefore be temporary by definition and progressively liber-
alized during the period of their application."2 9 Thus, Article XIX is
designed only for temporary relief from competing imports, and is
not meant to continually protect domestic industries from the conse-
quences of international free trade.
Article XIX had been invoked more than one hundred times by
the early 1980s.30 The United States has invoked the clause the most
times, but more recently Canada3 l and the European Economic
20 WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT, supra note 6, at 561 n.16.
21 Id. See also infra note 66, for how these terms apply to U.S. statutory law.
22 Sauermilch, Market Safeguards Against Import Competition: Article XIX of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 14 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 83, 94-95 (1982) ("The imposi-
tion of a quantitative restriction must be understood as a departure from the general obli-
gation to refrain from quantitative restrictions under Art. XI.").
23 INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION, supra note 13, at 292.
24 See generally M. BRONCKERS, SELECTIVE SAFEGUARD MEASURES IN MULTILATERAL
TRADE RELATIONS (1985).
25 Art. XIX, although an escape clause, still requires that MFN treatment be main-
tained. WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT, supra note 6, at 564-65.
26 GATT, supra note 6, art. XIX: 2. See also WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT,
supra note 6, at 564.
27 INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION, supra note 13, at 293. See supra notes 17 & 18.
28 Nothing in GATT makes this rule mandatory.
29 REPORT BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL TO THE FORTIETH SESSION OF THE CON-
TRACTING PARTIES, SAFEGUARDS, GATT BISD, 31st Supp. 136, 137 (1985).
30 See Sauermilch, supra note 22, at 96. See also M. BRONCEERS, supra note 24, at 31,
for a table listing all actions taken with recourse to Article XIX up through 1978.
SI Although Canada's first manufacturing escape clause case did not come until 1971,
recourse has picked up and recently been taken in the form of short term surtaxes on
[VOL. 13350
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Community32 have been frequent users. Despite the presence of do-
mestic safeguard statutes worldwide, criticism of Article XIX has
risen in recent years.33 It has been argued that the GAT escape
clause is fairly cumbersome to apply and easy to circumvent, 34 re-
flected by its relatively minimal use during its forty year history. As a
result of its failure to provide a solid basis for domestic short term
protection, countries have alternately bypassed Article XIX alto-
gether, and have instead looked towards voluntary export restraints
(VERs) or other protectionist measures outside the realm of the
GATT.3 5 Critics have asserted that the GATT escape clause needs
more effective provisions on multilateral control, and also needs
guarantees on the actual temporary character of the protectionist
action.36
There has been no real revision of Article XIX since its adop-
tion, 37 and a change may be necessary to achieve "trade liberaliza-
tion, to prevent more serious protectionist legislation from being
enacted, and to reduce pressure on countries to solve their economic
problems outside the multilateral framework."3 8 Perhaps the cur-
rent revisions of the U.S. escape clause reflect the inadequacies of
both the U.S. statute and the provisions embodied in the GATF, and
imported goods. Sarna, Safeguards Against Market Disruption-The Canadian View, 10 J.
WORLD TRADE L. 355, 357 (1976).
Section 8(2) of the Customs Tariff Act provides for relief where it appears to the
Governor Council that, upon a report by the Minister of Finance, imports from any coun.
try cause or threaten to cause serious injury to Canadian producers of like or directly
competitive goods. Customs Tariff Act, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. C-41, § 8(2) (1970).
32 The European Economic Community also has codified an escape clause. See Regu-
lation 288/82, O.J. EUR. COMM. [No. L 35] 1 (1982). It provides for a formal investigation
by the EEC Commission after consultations with an advisory committee of the Member
States. The procedure consists of surveillance of imports, followed by safeguard action
upon an affirmative finding of injury. See Lussenburg, New EEC Safeguard Measures: Regula-
tion 288/82, 16 CASE W. RES. J. INrr'L L. 337, 363 (1984). Lussenburg holds Regulation
288/82 changes the GATT standard of safeguard application, permits protective measures
to be applied selectively, and fails to provide adequate consultation procedures before
implementation of such measures. Id. at 363.
33 Art. XIX is one the most controversial clauses in the GATT, because unlike other
provisions, the criteria are less defined and more subjective. Lussenburg, supra note 31, at
339.
34 Merciai, supra note 10, at 49.
35 Id.
36 Id. Thus, obligations under GATT must be strengthened, then extended to volun-
tary export restraints, and made effective by temporary application.
37 Lussenburg, supra note 32, at 338. Although revision has been on the GATT's
agenda, to date neither amendments nor a separate safeguard code has met with the ap-
proval of the contracting parties.
38 Meiers, Externality Law and Market Safeguards: Applications in the GATT Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, 18 HARV. Irr'L L.J. 491, 499-500 (1977). Meiers argues that determina-
tion of injury is too often based on political pressures instead of economic analysis and
therefore that "some type of international commission or panel" should be in charge of
reviewing national procedures of inquiry to determine injury. National procedures, more-
over, are recommended to follow the U.S. International Trade Commission's procedure of
inquiry. Id. at 509-10.
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affirm the fear that more protectionist legislation will result if Article
XIX is not amended.
To understand the proposed revisions for the U.S. statute, a dis-
cussion of the history of the escape clause in U.S. trade policy is nec-
essary. Since World War II Congress has regularly revised the
escape clause, so the current proposals are certainly no exception to
past precedent. It has been properly stated that these revisions are
sort of a "bellweather" to congressional sentiments.39
The first time the escape clause appeared in U.S. trade relations
was in the 1942 Reciprocal Trade Agreement with Mexico.40 The
provision read much like the escape clause in Article XIX, and in-
deed the Trade Agreement served as the model for it.4 1 By the end
of the war, the free trade ideology was at its peak and the Trade
Agreements Act of 1945,42 which gave the President broad discre-
tion regarding tariff reduction, was enacted. Nonetheless, the Act
prompted congressional protectionist fears and lead to a compro-
mise Executive Order in 1947 that required an escape clause to be
included in all future trade agreements.43 The clause proved to be
reasonably popular even at this time of free-trade idealism, and the
Tariff Commission processed twenty-nine applications for relief
before the safeguard provision was legislatively adopted. 44
The escape clause was first codified in the Trade Agreements
Extension Act of 1951. 4 5 Section 7(a) of the Act provided that after
a petition was filed, the Tariff Commission had one year
to determine whether any product upon which a concession had
been granted under a trade agreement is ... being imported into the
United States in such increased quantities, either actual or relative,
as to cause or threaten serious injury to the domestic industry
purchasing like or directly competitive products. 46
The Tariff Commission was allowed to recommend relief to the
President if it found the industry met the specified criteria. 47 The
39 J. JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 630 (1974) [hereinafter
LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS].
40 See id. at 629.
41 Agreement Respecting Reciprocal Trade, Dec. 23, 1943, U.S.-Mexico, 57 Stat.
833, E.A.S. No. 311.
42 Ch. 269, 59 Stat. 410 (1945) (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1351-1352, 1354 (1982)).
43 Exec. Order No. 9832, 3 C.F.R. §§ 624-625 (1943-48 comp.). This was replaced
with Exec. Order No. 10004, which made the clause a permanent part o" U.S. law. Exec.
Order No. 10004, 3 C.F.R. §§ 819-821 (1943-48 comp.). See Comment, United States Trade
Laws: Reexamining the Escape Clause, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 261, 265 (1985) (discussing the Execu-
tive Orders and the early history of the U.S. escape clause).
44 Ris, Escape Clause Relief Under the Trade Act of 1974: New Standards, Same Results, 16
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 297, 301 (1977).
45 Trade Agreement Extension Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-50, § 7, 65 Stat. 72, 74
(repealed by the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 257(e)(1), 76 Stat.
882 (1962)) discussed in Comment, supra note 43, at 266-67.




President, however, was not required to grant relief, though he was
required to state his reasons for refusing to do so. 48 There was no
basis for congressional override of the President's determination un-
til the Trade Agreement Extension Act of 1958, which required a
two-thirds majority vote in both Houses to accomplish the task.49
One hundred-thirteen escape clause investigations were
brought between 1951 and 1962. The Tariff Commission recom-
mended relief in forty-one of these cases, but the President granted
relief in only fifteen. 50 Despite a low thirteen percent success rate
for domestic industries invoking the 1951 escape clause, Congress
enacted an even more stringent provision in the Trade Expansion
Act of 1962 (TEA).51 Under the TEA, a petition to the Commission
required a showing that imports had actually increased,52 that they
resulted "in major part" from a trade concession, 53 and that they
were "the major factor" in causing or threatening serious injury. 54
The direct link to a prior trade concession as the major force in
increasing imports greatly increased the burden of proof for a do-
mestic industry. 55 This provision actually went beyond the Article
XIX criteria by requiring the extra proof that the imports be due in
"major part" to a trade concession, rather than merely be due "to
the effect of the obligations incurred by a contracting party." 56
The requirement that the increased imports be the "major fac-
tor" of injury became another hindrance to the petitioner, particu-
larly because "major factor" was defined as a cause greater than all
the other causes.5 7 The Tariff Commission developed nonstatutory
indicia of injury and threat of injury. 58
With the heavy burden of proof established, it was very hard to
obtain relief under the TEA escape clause, as evidenced by the fact
that from 1962 to 1969 there was no determination of serious injury
48 Id. § 7(c), 65 Stat. at 74.
49 Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-886, §§ 6-7, 72 Stat.
673, 676-78 (1958).
50 See LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 39, at 633 (chart
summary of Tariff Commission investigations from 1951-1977).
51 Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 301, 76 Stat. 872, 884 (1962)
[hereinafter Trade Expansion Act].
52 Id. § 301(b)(1), 76 Stat. at 884.
53 Id.
54 Id. § 301(b)(3), 76 Stat. at 884.
55 Comment, supra note 43, at 268.
56 GATT, supra note 6, art. XIX: l(a).
57 "[Ilncreased imports shall be considered to cause, or threaten to cause serious
injury . . .when the Tariff Commission finds that such increased imports have been the
major factor in causing, or threatening to cause serious injury .. " Trade Expansion Act,
supra note 51, § 301(c)(3), 76 Stat. at 884 (emphasis added). See Applebaum, Section 201
(The Escape Clause) and Section 406 of the Trade Act of 1974, in U.S. IMPORT RELIEF LAWS-
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN LAW AND POLICY 137, 140 (1985) [hereinafter Applebaum
(1985)].
58 Applebaum (1985), supra note 57, at 140.
1988]
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by the Tariff Commission. 59 The Commission only found injury in
three out of thirty-two cases, and split its vote evenly in six others.60
The President, who had the right to decide on all nine of the split
votes and favorably determined cases, imposed import restraints
only four times, making for an eleven percent success rate under the
1962 clause.
Under the TEA, the President did not have to state why he re-
fused to order relief. Nor was there any provision for overriding his
decision if Congress disagreed with his finding. Frustration over the
rigid structure of the TEA aggravated by the deteriorating economy
of the early 1970s led to what some called a "new protectionism. ' 6 1
It was in the midst of such sentiment that Congress passed the Trade
Act of 1974 and a new escape clause.
The Trade Act of 1974 arose out of the feeling that the TEA was
inadequate in providing relief for domestic industries, and instead
promoted ad hoc voluntary restraint agreements (VRAs) for injured
industries without going through an independent fact finding
body. 62 The Congress thus felt there was a need to relax the criteria
for determining injury. In passing the new statute, Congress ex-
pressly acknowledged that the escape clause had worked reasonably
well under the 1951 provisions, 63 and formulated a new clause that
was in many ways reminiscent of the first statute.64
There are four central issues in the current statutory version of
the escape clause. 65 First, the domestic industry seeking relief has to
produce goods like, or directly competitive with, the imports under
review. 66
59 Williams Commission Report 62 (1971), in LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS, supra note 39, at 638-39.
60 See LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 39, at 633.
61 See generally Balassa, The New Protectionism, 12J. WORLD TRADE L. 409 (1978) (for an
explanation of this trend).
62 S. REP. No. 1298, 93rd Cong., 2d. Sess. 119, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 7263 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 1298].
63 According to the Report:
From 1951 through 1962 the escape clause worked reasonably well. The
criteria were fair and equitable, and relief was occasionally granted. How-
ever, in 1962 the Administration proposed and the Congress adopted rigid
and stringent tests of injury and causal relationships between tariff conces-
sions, increased imports and serious injury. As a result, the provisions of the
Trade Expansion Act of 1962 . . .have proven to be an inadequate mecha-
nism for providing relief to domestic industries injured by import
competition.
Id.
64 Under section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, it must be determined whether "an
article is being imported into the U.S. in such increased quantities as to be a substantial
cause of serious injury, or threat thereof, to the domestic industry producing an article like
or directly competitive with the imported article." 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(1) (1982).
65 Applebaum, Section 201 of the Trade,4ct of 1974, in U.S. TRADE LAW AND POLICY 195,
199 (1987) [hereinafter Applebaum (1987)].
66 Trade Act of 1974, § 201(b)(1), 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(1) (1982). "Like" is defined
as articles which are substantially identical in inherent or intrinsic characteristics with the imported
[VOL. 13
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Second, to obtain relief under section 201 the domestic industry
must prove that there is an increase in imports, which can be either
actual or relative to domestic production. 67 This differs from the
TEA requirement and is in accord with the interpretation given Arti-
cle XIX of the GAIT. 68 The increased imports no longer need be
due "in major part" to a trade concession. 69 Rather, section 201 re-
quires no causal connection with prior concessions at all. Congress
removed the requirement because the old rule had "been very diffi-
cult to satisfy in the past" and had become "a major barrier to im-
port relief."'70 Thus, the United States backed away from even the
lesser causal link to a concession as found in Article XIX. This move
does not violate the GAT, however. 71
The third major change in the 1974 escape clause was that it,
unlike the TEA, codified certain industry indicia to be used by the
Tariff Commission (now called the International Trade Commis-
sion) 72 to determine actual or threatened serious injury.73 "Serious
injury" has been defined as an "important, crippling or mortal in-
jury, one having permanent or lasting consequences. ' 74 "Threat of
serious injury" requires that the threat be "real, rather than specula-
tive," and that serious injury be "highly probable in the foreseeable
article. "Directly competitive" articles are those which are substantially equivalent for commer-
cialpurposes to like articles. See S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 62, at 121-22, 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 7265-66.
67 Trade Act of 1974, § 201(b)(2)(c), 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(2)(c) (1982). Cf. S. REP.
No. 1298, supra note 62, at 121, 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 7265 ("The
Committee feels that unless imports are increasing absolutely, they cannot be a substantial
cause of injury.").
68 See supra note 13.
69 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
70 S. REP No. 1298, supra note 62, at 120, 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at
7264.
71 The requirement of GATT, supra note 6, art. XIX: (l)(a), that the increased im-
ports be the result of the "effect of the obligations incurred" under the GATT, seems to
be as broad as the GATT itself. WORLD TIDE AND THE LAW OF GATT, supra note 6, at
559. According to Jackson:
The preparatory work clearly indicates that not only were tariff concessions
intended by this phrase but the elimination or reduction of quantitative re-
strictions were also included. The language seems even broader. Since the
obligation not to use quantitative restrictions applies to almost all products,
and since other obligations of GATT do apply to all products, it appears that
any product imported in "increased" quantities could occasion the use of
Article XIX. That is to say coincidence of GATT obligation appears to be es-
tablished for virtually all products.
Id. Thus, section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 and its lack of a causal link to a GATT
obligation or trade concession would not violate the GATT escape clause.
72 Trade Act of 1974, § 171(a), 19 U.S.C. § 2231(a) (1982).
73 Id. § 201(b)(2), 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(2). Serious injury factors include significant
idling of product facilities, inability to operate at a reasonable level of profit, and signifi-
cant unemployment. Threat of serious injury factors include declining sales, growing in-
ventory, and downward trend in production, profits, wages, or employment.
74 Applebaum (1987), supra note 65, at 203. See, e.g., Electric Shavers and Parts Thereof,
USITC Pub. 1819, Inv. No. TA-201-51 (1986).
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future." 75
The most significant difference between the current escape
clause and its predecessor, however, is that imports are no longer
required to be "a major factor" of the injury, but rather only a "sub-
stantial cause." Substantial cause has been defined as "a cause which
is important and not less than any other cause."'76
Section 202 of the Trade Act of 1974 deals with the role of the
President. It provides that he "shall" provide the import relief rec-
ommended by the Commission "unless he determines that provision
of such relief is not in the national economic interest of the United
States." 77 If the President denies relief, he must state why. 78 The
strength of the terms of section 202 suggest that Congress intended
escape clause relief to be more easily granted without actually upset-
ting the President's discretionary power. 79
Such a suggestion is given credibility in light of the statements
by the Senate Finance Committee that
this section would require the President to implement import re-
lief.... That relief ought not be denied for reasons that have noth-
ing whatsoever to do with the merits of the case as determined by
U.S. law. In particular, the Committee feels that no U.S. industry
which has suffered serious injury should be cut off from relief for
policy reasons. 8
0
For this reason, it was originally thought that the President was
seemingly obligated to grant import relief if the criteria were met.si
Additionally, Congress was given the right to override the President
"by a majority of the members of each House."'8 2 Under section
75 Applebaum (1987), supra note 65, at 203.
76 Trade Act of 1974, § 201(b)(l), (4), 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(1), (4) (1982). See S. REP.
No. 1298, supra note 62, at 120, 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 7264.
77 Id. § 2252(a)(l)(A). In deciding whether the relief is in the national interest the
President must take into account several factors, including the probable effectiveness of
import relief as a means to promote adjustment; the effect of relief on consumers; the
effect on the international economic interests of the United States; the effect on U.S. in-
dustries that might be hurt by possible compensatory import restrictions; and the eco-
nomic and social cost to the taxpayer, worker, and community. Id. § 2252(c).
78 Id. § 2252(b)(1).
79 Comment, supra note 43, at 271. The escape clause as codified under the Trade
Act of 1974 does not provide for judicial review of either the ITC's decision or the Presi-
dent's determination. See Kennedy, Presidential Authority Under Section 337, Section 301, and
the Escape Clause: The Case for Less Discretion, 20 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 127, 137 (1987).
Such lack of review was attacked in Mapleleaf Fish Co. v. United States, 762 F.2d 86
(Fed. Cir. 1985), in which the Federal Circuit determined that it could not interfere with
the President unless his action went beyond his delegated authority.
80 S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 62, at 124, 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at
7268 (emphasis added).
81 Note, Title H of the Trade Act of 1974: What Changes Hath Congress Wrought to Relief
from Injury Caused by Import Competition, 10J. INT'L L. & ECON. 197, 211 (1975).
82 Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 203(c)(1), 88 Stat. 2016 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.
§ 2253 (Supp. III 1985)). Because this provision denied the President's veto power and
therefore could be considered unconstitutional, it was amended and now provides for a
joint majority vote by both Houses that can be vetoed by the President. At any rate, Con-
gress has never tried to override the President's decision. Kennedy, supra note 79, at 155.
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203, relief can last up to five years for the injured industry,8 3 and
may be terminated if the President at any time considers termination
to be in the national interest.8 4
Despite the apparent strengthening of the escape clause in favor
of petitioning industries, only sixty investigations have been com-
pleted by the International Trade Commission (ITC) under section
201.85 A majority of ITC Commissioners found injury in twenty-
nine of these cases, and the President received a total of thirty-three
cases (four of them because the Commissioners were equally di-
vided)86 The President granted some form of relief in twenty-one 87
of those referred to him.88 Thus, relief was granted in twenty-one
out of sixty cases, for about a thirty-five percent success rate for peti-
tioning industries.8 9
The Trade Act of 1974 has therefore proven to be a somewhat
more effective escape clause for those American industries seeking
relief than were its predecessors. 90 Nonetheless, section 201 has not
been a consistently reliable method for obtaining relief, particularly
because of the discretionary control the President exercises under
the clause. For example, of the twelve cases for which the President
refused to provide any relief whatsoever, he justified his refusal in
ten cases by saying that import relief would not be in the nation's
economic interest.91 In the other two cases, which were split deci-
sions by the ITC, the President simply agreed with the Commission-
83 Trade Act of 1974, § 203(h)(1), 19 U.S.C. § 2253(h)(1) (1982).
84 Id. at (h)(4). This procedure was followed in regards to the mushroom industry.
See Proclamation No. 4904, 47 Fed. Reg. 8753 (1982).
85 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE FACT SHEET, INTERNATIONAL TRADE ACTIVITY UNDER
SECTION 201 OF THE TRADE ACT OF 1974 2 (1987) [hereinafter GAO FACT SHEET].
86 Id. In cases where the Commissioners are equally divided, the President is re-
quired to render a decision. Congress, by enacting section 201, sought to avoid these split
vote situations. See also S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 62, at 121, 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 7265 ("In all cases the Commission should seek to reach a majority vote
on the matter before it. The effect of a 'no decision' tie vote in an escape clause case is to
give the President complete discretion without much guidance about the case.").
87 These twenty-one cases included relief given in the form of adjustment assistance
under Title II of the Trade Act of 1974, which can be given to workers in the form of cash
benefits for readjustment allowances or service benefits for job relocation. Industries can
also petition for and receive assistance in the form of trade adjustments grants. This is
technically not an imposition on fairly traded imports.
88 GAO FACT SHEET, supra note 85, at 2. The President provided tariffs or tariff-rate
quotas in eight cases, quotas in three cases, adjustment assistance in nine cases, and an
income support program in one instance. In four cases out of the twenty-one, he in-
structed the USTR to seek orderly marketing agreements or voluntary restraint
agreements.
89 The President granted actual import relief in only twelve of those cases (as opposed
to including the nine adjustment assistance cases). See Applebaum (1987), supra note 65,
at 220. This adjustment makes for a less impressive 20% success rate.
90 This can be compared with the 13% success rate under the Trade Agreements
Extension Act of 1951, and the 11% rate under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.
91 GAO FACT SHEET, supra note 85, at 3.
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ers who had found no injury.92
Even of the twenty-one cases in which the President found injury
and granted relief, he gave less than that advised by the ITC in a
majority of the cases. 93 This was accomplished by giving a lesser
form of relief (e.g., by making adjustment assistance rather than im-
posing a quota or tariff on imports), or by simply granting the same
kind recommended by the Commission at a reduced level. 94 In
seven cases, the President gave relief at a lesser level than that rec-
ommended, and in only three cases did he grant the relief that he
was advised to grant. 95
In summary, the statistics reveal that even with a favorable rul-
ing by the ITC, which clearly found injury in forty-eight percent of
petitioner's requests, an industry has faced still closer executive scru-
tiny. Such scrutiny has usually taken the national interest into ac-
count, and consequently has eliminated roughly a third of those
cases that survived the ITC. In addition, even if relief has been
granted for the industry by the President, it has more often than not
been less than that advised by the Commission.
The lack of success for petitioning industries, as evidenced by
the preceding statistics, has led many to question the wisdom of
bringing a petition for escape clause relief.96 Indeed, Sen. Hollins of
South Carolina once remarked that "going the 201 route is for suck-
ers. '97 Specifically, there has been distress over the fact that the suc-
cess of a section 201 action depends not only on the petitioner's
ability to prove his case before the ITC, but also on the political cli-
mate of the nation within the international marketplace. 98 Critics of
section 201 have asserted that a strongly anti-protectionist President
can make the escape clause virtually useless. 99 Moreover, they con-
tend no clear pattern emerges from looking at the affirmative Presi-
dential determinations for relief,' 00 except that it appears the
President is more likely to withhold relief when a large industry is
involved because of the threat of more serious retaliation under the
GATT. 1° 1 Otherwise, the President seems to have responded in an
ad hoc manner. 10 2
At any rate, the factors for a strong section 201 case remain a
92 Id. at 4.
93 Id. at 3. This occurred eleven times.
94 Id. at 3.
95 Id.
96 See generally Note, The Domestic Shoe Industry's Attempt for Relieffrom Imports, 17 LAw &
POLY IN INT'L Bus. 815, 841-42 (1985).
97 Id. at 842 (quoting 131 CONG. REC. S15,315 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1985)).
98 See Comment, supra note 43, at 278.
99 E.g., Ris, supra note 44, at 322.
100 Kennedy, supra note 79, at 147.
101 Id. at 150.
102 Id. at 147.
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mystery. The variability and uncertainty of receiving a Presidential
grant of import relief can be illustrated by a tale of a meeting in the
White House in the early 1960s. At the meeting, it was decided to
grant two out of four petitions for escape clause relief, and the two
favorable selections were determined by flipping a coin. 10 3
This seemingly arbitrary power in the discretion given the Presi-
dent under section 201 has been hotly criticized, most recently and
heavily in the case of Non-Rubber Footwear.'0 4 In a situation that
many, including the ITC, thought demanded relief, President Rea-
gan refused to grant any, concluding it would not be in the nation's
economic interest.' 0 5 First, the President said that relief would place
"a costly and unjustifiable burden on U.S. consumers."' 0 6 Second,
he stated that the United States would suffer as much as "$2.1 billion
in trade damage through compensatory tariff reductions or retalia-
tory actions by foreign suppliers."' 0 7 The relief would have had a
major impact on foreign suppliers (such as Brazil), who are highly
dependent on footwear exports, in that it would have lessened their
ability to import U.S. goods and "thus cause an additional decline in
U.S. exports." Third, the President did not believe that relief would
promote industry adjustment to meet increased import
competition.' 08
Whether the President was right or wrong, his statement and
rationale for rejecting the petition and the subsequent ITC recom-
mendation give an idea of what is actually at stake when enacting
trade restrictions on fairly traded imports. Clearly, the repercus-
sions go far beyond the industry itself. Political and diplomatic fac-
tors must therefore be taken into account, ' 09 especially in light of the
right to retaliate under Article XIX(3) of the GATT.I10 For example,
if relief is granted, other countries may seek compensating tariff ben-
efits from the United States on other products, or, as previously ex-
plained in President Reagan's statement, may simply retaliate against
U.S. goods."' Obviously, such a situation generates intense polit-
103 Perry, Administration of Import Trade Laws By The United States International Trade Com-
mission, 3 B.U. INr'L L.J. 345, 375 (1985) (quoting Horlick, Trade Policy in a Presidential Elec-
tion Year, 11 TRADE TRENDS 5 (1984)).
104 Non-Rubber Footwear, 50 Fed. Reg. 35,205 (1985) [hereinafter Non-Rubber Footwear].
See Kennedy, supra note 79 (discussing the case).




109 Sandier, Primer on U.S. Trade Remedies, 19 1'rr'L LAw. 761, 788 (1985).
110 GATT, supra note 6, Art. XIX:3(a) ("[Ilf such action is taken or continued, the
affected contracting parties shall then be free .... to suspend ... the application to the
trade of the contracting party taking such action ... of such substantially equivalent obli-
gations of concessions or other obligation under this agreement .....
I Il Sandier, supra note 109, at 784.
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ical pressure on the President from numerous lobby groups."t 2
Traditionally, the executive branch has pursued international
trade from a free trade policy. "3 This ideological stance can be seen
in both Republican and Democratic presidential policy in dealing
with section 201,'14 and helps explain the low rate of recovery for
petitioning industries under this highly protectionist statute.
Clearly, section 201 appears to promise more relief than it actu-
ally delivers due to the discretionary power it vests in the Presi-
dent." 15 Nevertheless, the legislative intent seems to plainly require
the President to implement relief after an affirmative finding of in-
jury by the ITC." 1 6 This has led some to argue that Presidential dis-
cretion should be eliminated under the statute."t 7 These critics
assert that without such a change, section 201 lacks teeth and is pre-
vented from being the depoliticized statute that it was intended to
be," l8 and that it unduly raises expectations on the part of the peti-
tioning industry.' ' Further, they contend that the granting of
sweeping executive powers has abandoned the traditional rational
for the escape clause, 120 and allowed section 201 to become one of
the most politically charged trade laws.12
Proponents of section 201 as it now exists, however, claim that
112 Id.
I 13 For example, in Carbon and Certain Alloy Steel Products, President Reagan in denying
relief stated, "In responding to this pressing import problem, we must do all we can to
avoid protectionism, to keep our market open to free and fair competition, and to provide
certainty of access for our trading partners." Carbon and Alloy Steel Products, 49 Fed. Reg.
36,813 (1984).
114 See GAO FACT SHEET, supra note 85, chart at 6-9.
President Ford received thirteen cases from the ITC. He granted actual import relief
in three cases (in the form of OMAs or quotas), granted adjustment assistance six times,
gave an income support program in one case, and ruled down all forms of relief as not
being "in the national economic interest" in three cases.
President Carter, in the fourteen cases referred to him, imposed the recommended
tariff or quota in six cases. Of the eight cases in which he refused to grant relief, he used
the "national economic interest" rationale in seven of them.
Ronald Reagan has never refused to grant some form of relief after an affirmative
finding of injury by the ITC. But of the six cases referred to him, he was recommended to
grant a quota or tariff increase in each one, but did so only three times, and gave adjust-
ment assistance in the other three.
115 See Kennedy, supra note 79, at 151.
116 "This section (202) would require the President to implement import relief...
S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 62, at 124, 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 7268.
117 See Kennedy, supra note 79, at 155; Note, supra note 96, at 843.
118 Kennedy, supra note 79, at 157.
''9 Id. at 151.
120 Comment, supra note 43, at 284. If "protectionism were to suddenly become fash-
ionable as our trade deficit increases, the President could easily justify relief to domestic
markets and thereby subvert the original purpose of the escape clause." Id.
The argument for removing such Presidential discretion thus works both ways; it may
discourage protectionism, or conversely, may allow more petitioners to get more reliable
relief. See Kennedy, supra note 79, at 154-58.
121 Kennedy, supra note 79, at 157. Kennedy suggests requiring the President to grant
appropriate relief after a favorable ITC decision, and that he should never be allowed to
refuse to do so. Furthermore, the President should be required to adopt the relief recom-
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expanding the escape clause to give more certain relief to U.S. indus-
tries by the removal of Presidential discretion might result in relief
going to industries simply because of a recession. The certain result,
they contend, would be the wreck of the economy.' 2 2 This upheaval
would occur first by straining relations between the United States
and its major trading partners, and second, by leading unqualified,
inefficient industries to seek, and perhaps attain, economically unjus-
tified relief.'23 Proponents also argue that the United States escape
clause, with its roots in Article XIX of the GAIT, is designed only
for temporary relief. Furthermore, the escape clause by its very na-
ture is designed to be "political," because the granting of relief has
both national and international economic consequences that tran-
scend the concerns for the domestic industry.
The arguments for and against a major revision of section 201
underlie the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Legislation 24
which is currently before conference on Capital Hill. Within this vo-
luminous bill are both House proposals and Senate amendments
that could effect some changes on the escape clause as embodied
under the Trade Act of 1974.
Both legislative bodies propose that there be provisional import
relief under the escape clause if "critical circumstances exist."' 25 Ac-
cording to the Senate amendment, such circumstances exist if a sig-
nificant increase of imports (actual or relative) over a short period of
time has led to circumstances in which a delay in import relief would
cause damage to domestic industry that would be difficult to remedy
at the time relief would normally be provided.' 26 The President
would make the determination as to whether these critical circum-
stances exist.1 27 In the House version, the criteria are much the
same, but the ITC would make the final determination.12 8 Relief
available under the Senate provision would be any measures author-
ized normally under the escape clause. 129 Under the House provi-
sion, the ITC could order immediate suspension of liquidation of all
items of the merchandise under investigation, and could order the
posting of a bond or cash deposit.' 30
mended by the ITC in absence of any compelling foreign affairs concern. This is all with
the underlying hope of obtaining more predictability under section 201. Id. at 157-58.
122 Recent Decision, The Harley-Davidson Case: Escaping the Escape Clause, 16 LAw &
POL'Y IN Irr'L Bus. 325, 348 (1984).
123 Id.
124 OMNIBUS TRADE LEGISLATION, supra note 1, at 71 (illustrating S. 1420, supra note 1,
§§ 201-204; H.R. 3, supra note 1, §§ 201-204).
125 Id. at 73 (illustrating S. 1420, supra note 1, § 202(a)(1); H.R. 3, supra note 1,
§ 203(g)(2)(A)).
126 Id. (illustrating S. 1420, supra note 1, § 202(a)(2)).
127 Id.
128 Id. (illustrating H.R. 3, supra note 1, § 203(g)(2)(A)).
129 Id. (illustrating S. 1420, supra note 1, § 202(a)(2)).
IS0 Id. (illustrating H.R. 3, supra note 1, § 203(g)(2)(A)).
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Another entirely new provision in the 1987 legislation is a mea-
sure for industry adjustment plans. The Senate plan proposes that
the petitioner must submit in its petition a plan to promote adjust-
ment to import competition. 131 The House bill proposes the same,
but merely says petitioner may submit such a plan.132
The proposed legislation also makes some changes as to the
promptness for determination of injury.'" a The Trade Act of 1974
provided no statutory deadline for such determination, but instead
required the ITC to report both the injury determination and the rec-
ommended relief within six months of petition. The Senate would
require the injury determination within 150 days of petition, 34 and
the remedy recommendation within the next 30 days.' 35 The House
would require the first decision within 120 days,' 36 and the second
within 60 days. 137
Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 cited several factors to be
considered with respect to serious injury and threat of serious in-
jury.' 3 8 The proposed revisions keep the factors with regard to seri-
ous injury, and add additional factors to help determine the threat of
serious injury.' 39 These include a decrease in domestic industry's
market share and the extent to which foreign imports are being di-
verted to the U.S. market by reason of trade restraints. 140
The causation standard of the 1974 Act, which provides that im-
ports must be a substantial cause of serious injury, is clarified under
the current proposals. Both the Senate and the House propose that
the ITC consider the condition of the industry over the course of its
business cycle, and that it "shall not aggregate the causes of declin-
ing demand associated with a recession . . . into a single cause of
serious injury."' 14 1 The Senate amendment goes even further in its
cautions against undeserved relief by requiring the ITC to examine
and report on factors other than imports that may be a cause of
injury. 142
Most of the proposed changes listed above are not drastic, and
seem to streamline the escape clause without making it any more
protectionist. The House version of the trade legislation, however,
131 Id. at 74 (illustrating S. 1420, supra note 1, § 201(a)(1)(B)).
132 Id. (illustrating H.R. 3, supra note 1, § 201(b)(1)).
133 Id. at 76, 78.
134 Id. (illustrating S. 1420, supra note 1, § 201(d)).
135 Id. at 78 (illustrating S. 1420, supra note 1, § 203(d)).
136 Id. at 76 (illustrating H.R. 3, supra note 1, § 20 3 (g)).
137 Id. at 78 (illustrating H.R. 3, supra note 1, § 203(h)(1)).
138 See supra note 73.
139 OMNIBUS TRADE LEGISLATION, supra note 1, at 77 (illustrating S. 1420, supra note 1,
§ 201(b)(2)(A); H.R. 3, supra note 1, § 203(c)(1)(B)).
140 Id.
141 Id. (illustrating S. 1420, supra note 1, § 201(b)(10); H.R. 3, supra note 1,
§ 203(c)(3)).
142 Id. (illustrating S. 1420, supra note 1, § 201(b)(9)).
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contains a proposal that purports to eliminate the President's posi-
tion in the process. According to the House plan, the entire petition
for relief would never come under Presidential scrutiny, but instead
the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) would totally replace the
President in the process for provision of import relief. 143 The House
bill would require that within thirty days of an affirmative decision
from the ITC, the USTR must either (1) provide relief, to the extent
that, and for such time as, the USTR determines necessary; 144 or (2)
not provide import relief because the provision of any relief would
threaten U.S. national security, or because the economic costs are so
great that they outweigh the economic and social benefits of provid-
ing import relief.145
The House provision is seemingly severe in its removal of the
President, but it nonetheless leaves a large amount of discretion in
the hands of an executive officer (the USTR). Thus, there appears to
be no real significance to this proposal.
The Senate version does not remove the President from the pro-
cess, but provides that within sixty days of the ITC's determination
he must take the actions recommended by the ITC or substantially
equivalent actions 146 unless the President determines such action
would: (1) endanger U.S. national security, (2) disproportionately
burden U.S. agriculture, (3) result in a loss of jobs greater than the
number of jobs preserved or created, (4) result in substantially seri-
ous injury to any domestic industry, or (5) disproportionately burden
the poor. 147
Thus, the Senate provision may serve to curb Presidential dis-
cretion by more narrowly defining the grounds for refusal of import
relief. This compares with the broader right to refuse under the
1974 Act if the granting of such relief was not in "the national inter-
est."'1 48 While the current areas left to the discretion of the Presi-
dent could prove to be very extensive, it is questionable as to
whether these discretionary provisions will even survive in
conference. 149
The proposals found within the Omnibus Trade and Competi-
tiveness Legislation could serve to make the escape clause more effi-
cient and beneficial to petitioning industries without providing a
means for relief to industries merely bogged down in a recessionary
cycle. However, as the proposed legislation now exists, it cannot be
seen as an extreme step away from free-trade or GAT principles,
143 Id. at 82 (illustrating H.R. 3, supra note 1, § 204.
144 Id. (illustrating H.R. 3, supra note 1, § 204(a)(l)(A)).
145 Id. (illustrating H.R. 3, supra note 1, § 204(a)(1)(B)).
146 Id. at 82 (illustrating S. 1420, supra note 1, § 204(a)(1)).
147 Id. at 82 (illustrating S. 1420, supra note 1, § 204(a)(2)).
148 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
149 See 4 I.T.R. 1158 (1987).
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nor can it be viewed as a protectionist revision. The "revamping" of
section 201, at this point, has simply not brought any tremendous
changes. Nonetheless, the capacity exists for the 1987 revisions to
leave conference stripped of any provisions for executive discretion.
This could lead the new escape clause to operate (or at least be seen)
as a protectionist measure, and therefore be harmful to U.S. trade
policy.
Though the final result of the 1987 trade legislation must be left
to speculation, it appears once again that Congress is sending the
signal that the escape clause should provide a better chance of suc-
cess when invoked. Such congressional reaction appears justified in
light of the escape clause's history and its limited ability to provide
relief. The reaction can further be explained when this country's tre-
mendous trade deficit and its corresponding "buy American" cam-
paign are taken into consideration.
The desire to free up the escape clause mechanism, however,
may not be consistent with the original GATT clause that provided
for escape from a trade concession when imports as a result of such a
concession were injuring domestic industry. At any rate, the Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Legislation is testimony to the fact that
Article XIX, and the U.S. statutes that implemented it, have not been
truly adequate in their provision of relief from fairly traded imports,





Summary of Section 201 Cases
January 1975 Through January 1987
Investigation ITC finding/
number Product Date filed recommendation (a) Presidential action
TA-201-1 Birch plywood 04-18-75 Negative. No relief. (b)
door skins
TA-201-2 Bolts, nuts, and 05-22-75 Negative. No relief. (b)
screws of iron or
steel
TA-201-3 Wrapper tobacco 05-05-75 Negative. No relief. (b)
TA-201-4 Asparagus 07-10-75 Equally divided. No relief. Agreed with
Those voting those commissioners
affirmative that found no injury
recommended import to the domestic
quotas. industry.
TA-201-5 Stainless steel 07-16-75 Affirmative with Import relief through
and alloy tool respect to certain an orderly marketing
steel products. agreement with Japan,
Recommended import 3-year quotas on other
quotas. suppliers, adjustment
assistance for workers.
TA-201-6 Slide fasteners 08-18-75 Equally divided. Expedited adjustment
















TA-201-9 Certain gloves 09-08-75 Negative. No relief. (b)
TA-201-10 Mushrooms 09-17-75 Affirmative. Expedited adjustment
Recommendations assistance for growers,
included adjustment canners, and their
assistance (3) and employees.
tariff-rate quotas (1).
TA-201-11 Ferricyanide and 10-02-75 Affirmative. No relief due to
ferrocyanide Recommended tariff national economic
blue pigments increase. interest.
TA-201-12 Shrimp 11-17-75 Equally divided. Expedited trade
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Appendix
Summary of Section 201 Cases
January 1975 Through January 1987
Investigation ITC finding/
number Product Date filed recommendation (a) Presidential action
TA-201-13 Round stainless 12-12-75 Negative. No relief. (b)
steel wire
TA-201-14 Honey 12-29-75 Affirmative. No relief due to
Recommended tariff- national economic
rate quotas. interest.
TA-201-15 Plant hangers 06-22-76 Negative. No relief (b)
TA-201-16 Sugar 09-17-76 Affirmative. Instituted income
Recommended support program for
reduced import domestic sugar
quotas. producers.
TA-201-17 Mushrooms 09-20-76 Affirmative. No relief due to
Recommendations national economic
included 5-year tariff- interest.
rate quota (3) and
adjustment assistance
(2).
TA-201-18 Footwear 09-28-76 Affirmative. Expedited and
Recommendations expanded trade
include quotas (4), adjustment assistance;
tariff increase (1) and negotiated orderly
adjustment assistance marketing agreements
(1). with Republic of
Korea and Taiwan.
TA-201-19 Television 09-22-76 Affirmative with Negotiated orderly





TA-201-20 Low-carbon 01-10-77 Negative. No relief (b)
ferrochromium
TA-201-21 Cast-iron 01-21-77 Negative. No relief. (b)
cooking ware
TA-201-22 Fresh-cut flowers 01-31-77 Negative. No relief. (b)
TA-201-23 Certain 02-18-77 Negative. No relief. (b)
headwear
TA-201-24 Cast-iron stoves 03-09-77 Equally divided. No relief. Agreed with
Those voting those commissioners
affirmative who found no serious
recommended import injury to domestic
duties industry.









Summary of Section 201 Cases
January 1975 Through January 1987
Investigation ITC finding/
number Product Date filed recommendation (a) Presidential action
TA-201-27 Bolts, nuts, and 06-10-77 Affirmative. No relief due to
large screws of Recommended import national economic
iron or steel duties, interest.
TA-201-28 High-carbon 07-01-77 Affirmative. No relief due to
ferrochromium Recommended import national economic
duties, interest.
TA-201-29 Citizens band 08-02-77 Affirmative. Modified
(CB) radio Recommendations Commission's
transceivers included increased recommendation due
import duties (36% in to national economic
first year with 5% interest. Proclaimed
reductions in 4 tariff increase of 15%
subsequent years) (3), in first year with 3%
and adjustment reductions in 2
assistance (3). subsequent years,
after which it will
revert to the current
rate of 6%.
TA-201-30 Certain stainless 12-08-77 Affirmative. No relief due to
steel flatware Recommendations national economic
included import duties interest.
(4) and tariff-rate
quotas (1).
TA-201-31 Unalloyed, 12-20-77 Negative. No relief. (b)
unwrought zinc
TA-201-32 Unalloyed, 02-23-78 Affirmative. No relief due to
unwrought Recommended import national economic
copper quotas for 5 years. interest.
TA-201-33 Bicycle tires and 03-02-78 Affirmative. No relief due to
tubes Recommendations national economic
included increased interest.




TA-201-34 Certain fishing 03-21-78 Affirmative with No relief due to
tackle respect to artificial national economic
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TA-201-35 High-carbon 06-12-78 Affirmative. Modified
ferrochromium Recommendations Commission's
included 5-year recommendation due
graduated quota (1) to national economic
and increased import interest. Proclaimed
duties (3). Majority tariff increase of 4
recommended cents/lb. on products
increase of 30% to valued at less than 38
existing rate for 2 cents/lb. for 3 years
years with gradual after which it will
reductions in revert to the current
subsequent years. rate of .625 cents/lb.
TA-201-36 Clothespins Initiated Affirmative. Established 3-year
by ITC Recommended 5-year quota of 2 million
on quota of 3.2 million gross on clothespins
07-27-78 gross on wood and valued at no more
plastic spring than $1.70/gross.
clothespins.
TA-201-37 Bolts, nuts, and 06-09-78 Affirmative. Modified
large screws of Recommended import Commission's
iron or steel duties of about 20% recommendation.
during first 2 years, Granted 15% tariff on
and 15, 10, and 10 for large screws, and 157
next 3 years. plus current tariffs of
0.2 and 0.1 cents/lb.
for bolts and nuts,
respectively, for 3
years.
TA-201-38 Certain machine 08-07-78 Negative. No relief. (b)
needles
TA-201-39 Non-electric 05-04-79 Affirmative. Granted tarif increase
cookware Recommended tariff to be phased down
increase to be phased over 4 years, from 20
down over 5 years, cents/lb. in the first
from 25 cents/lb. in year to 10 cents/lb. in
the first year to 10 fourth year.
cents/lb. in fifth year.
TA-201-40 Leather wearing 07-24-79 Affirmative with No relief due to




increase for coats not
over $150.
TA-201-41 Certain fish. 08-20-79 Negative. No relief. (b)
TA-201-42 Fresh cut roses 11-15-79 Negative. No relief. (b)
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TA-201-43 Mushrooms 03-14-80 Affirmative. Granted tariff increase
Recommended quotas to be phased down
of 86M lbs. in first over 3 years, from
year, 94M lbs. in 20% in first year to
second year and 103M 10% in the third year.
lbs. in third and final
year. Quotas to be
allocated on a per
country basis at
President's discertion.




TA-201-45 Fishing rods and 07-13-81 Negative. No relief (b)
parts
TA-201-46 Tubeless-tire 04-16-82 Negative. No relief. (b)
valves
TA-201-47 Heavyweight 09-01-82 Affirmative with Granted tariff
motorcycles and respect to heavyweight increases
engines and motorcycles, recommended by ITC,
powor train Recommended tariff but for certain
subassemblies increase to be phased countries also
down over 5 years imposed tariff-rate
from 45% in first year quotas (increasing
to 10% in fifth year. yearly for 5 years.)
Additional duties
would be applied only
to quantities over
quotas.
TA-201-48 Stainless steel 11-23-82 Affirmative, Granted 4 years of
and alloy tool Recommended 3-year relief to specialty steel
steel market share quotas in form of digressive
on stainless steel and tariffs for stainless
certain alloy tool steel steel sheet, strip, and





steel bar, rod, and
alloy steel.
TA-201-49 Stainless steel 12-13-83 Negative. No relief (b)
table flatware
TA-201-50 Non-rubber 01-23-84 Negative. No relief. (b)
footwear
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TA-201-51 Carbon and 01-24-84 Affirmative with 'Outlined
certain alloy respect to certain administrative
steel products products. program to promote
Recommendations steel industry
included tariffs and adjustment directing
quotas (3) and no USTR to negotiate





TA-201-52 Unwrought 01-26-84 Affirmative. Directed the Dept. of
copper Recommendations Labor to coordinate
included tariff increase retraining and
of 5 cents/lb. for 5 relocation of workers
years on refined in industry and
copper and blister directed the Dept. of
copper (2), quotas in Commerce to manitor
aggregate amount of copper imports and
425,000 short tons/yr conditions in the
for 5 years (2) and no industry.
relief (1).
TA-201-53 Certain canned 02-14-84 Negative. No relief. (b)
tuna fish
TA-201-54 Potassium 11-30-84 Negative. No relief. (b)
permanganate
TA-201-55 Non-rubber 12-31-84 Affirmative. President directed Sec.
footwear Recommendations of Labor to work with
inlcuded overall state and local officials
import quotas for 5 to facilitate footwear
years of 474M pairs industry adjustment.
for shoes valued over
$2.50 and auctioning
of import licenses (4)
and adjustment
assistance with a quota
auctioned to the
public if a quota is
imposed (1).
TA-201-56 Wood shakes 09-25-85 Affirmative. Imposed tariff of 35%
and shingles Recommendations during first 30
inlcuded tariff of 35% months, 20% during
for 5 years on wood months 31-54 and 8%
shingles and shakes of during months 55-60.
western red cedar (3)
and adjustment
assistance (I).
TA-201-57 Electric shavers 09-27-85 Negative. No relief. (b)
and parts
TA-201-58 Certain metal 12-03-85 Negative. No relief. (b)
castings
TA-201-59 Apple juice 12-27-85 Negative. No relief. (b)
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TA-201-60 Steel fork arms 01-17-86 Negative. No relief. (b)
' Numbers in parentheses represent the number of commissioners recommending each type
of relief.
' Since the ITC found no injury, it did not forward this case to the President for action.
Source: ITC: Annual Reports for 1975 through 1985 and Operation of the Trade Agreements
Program (Reports 27 through 37)
Source: GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE FACT SHEET, INTERNATIONAL TRADE ACTIvrrY UNDER
SECTION 201 OF THE TRADE ACT OF 1974 6-9 (1987).

